Summary of “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth” Essay Sample

• Existing statement: Preemption is most likely way to armed struggle ( Int’l system as fit pulverization keg. waiting for individual flicker to detonate into war ) BUT these claims have non been matched by extended empirical scholarship. has non been proven. Reiter’s Argument:

• Empirical determination: pre-emptive wars about ne’er happen ; in instances where they did go on. it was due to other motives for war + conditions hypothesized to take to pre-emptive war e. g. belief in military advantage of moving first a factors taking to pre-emptive wars are unsubstantial causal forces Definition of pre-emptive war. its topographic point in academic theories on causes of war & A ; function in policy arguments

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• Definition: Preemption is a scenario for war predicted by some theories ; war that breaks out when aggressor feels that itself will be mark of a military onslaught in the short term and motivated by fright. ( Perception of short term menace to national security ) • Preemptive war is a cardinal anticipation of the coiling theoretical account of war and an of import constituent of offense-defense theory. two prima theories of the causes of war. 1. Coiling theoretical account: Explains the kineticss of international crises – pre-emptive war is the predicted result of a spiral in a crisis. after tensenesss coiling to the point where one believes the other is about to assail and hence work stoppages first pre-emptively. Hyphothesis: pre-emptive wars become more likely when provinces believe that other provinces are hostile and pose at hand military menaces 2. Offense-defense balance: Argues that wars are more likely when the discourtesy is perceived to hold comparative advantage on the battleground.

Cardinal statement bookmans make when discoursing how sensed offense laterality can do crises to intensify to war – utile account for why provinces with basically defensive foreign policy purposes can falter into war • Preemption as an of import concern in policy arguments – e. g. How war could hold broke out in Europe during the Cold War • Jervis: Although atomic war might interrupt out due to a assortment of factors. the last measure in about all of them would be preemption • Certain arms and schemes could increase opportunities of pre-emption during a crisis e. g. battlefield atomic arms. counterforce arms and aiming schemes etc Evidence for Reiter’s claim that pre-emptive wars about ne’er go on

• View that has best historical back uping grounds: Preemptive wars are infrequent • Empirical determination: Preemptive wars about ne’er go on with merely 3 out of 67 wars on the COW ( Correlates of War ) information set being pre-emptive: WWI Russo-German interactions in July 1914. Chinese intercession in the Korean War 1950 and Israeli onslaught on Egypt in 1967. • Case treatment demonstrated that even in these 3 instances of war. pre-emption was non the primary motor 1. 1967 Arab-Israel war: Egypt’s mobilisation and deployment of military personnels into the Sinai and shutting of the Straits of Tiran ( important waterway for Israeli transportation ) convinced the Israelis that an onslaught was at hand a Israel seized the military advantage and struck first Argument against pre-emptive war: Israel had of import motivations for war – closing of the Straits had of import political and economic deductions for Israel + Israel’s pre-emptive onslaught came subsequently than pre-emptive theories would foretell as they delayed military action due to concerns about the political reverberations of taking pre-emptive action ( respect to US force per unit area to avoid war ) which should non be a factor to see in pre-emptive war

2. WWI: Russian determination were non pre-emptive ; did non fear Austria and was alternatively motivated by the desire to keep an drawn-out hindrance over Serbia Germans were besides inauspicious to pre-emption as they wanted opposition to strike foremost so that duty for war would be held by opposition ; motivated by political considerations which delayed preemptiona did non automatically react to incremental Russian moves with hostile actions.

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