Epistemology Essay Research Paper Plato
Epistemology Essay, Research Paper
Plato & # 8217 ; s View in Human Knowledge
Plato nowadayss three different positions about cognition in Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus. In Meno & # 8217 ; s instance, Plato believes cognition as something innate in us when we are born ; in his ulterior position, in Republic, Plato believes we perceive things and addition cognition ; and from the last position, in Theaetus, Plato believes cognition is the combination of a true sentiment and a rational sentiment. Queerly adequate, Plato & # 8217 ; s positions in Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus are similar, sing the features of cognition. Despite that, Plato & # 8217 ; s positions in Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus have different grades of failing in developing his statement about cognition.
The concrete features of cognition of Plato & # 8217 ; s positions in Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus are similar. Harmonizing to Ron & # 8217 ; s Palace,
there are two indispensable features of the psyche. First, cognition must be certain and infallible. Second, cognition must hold as its object that which is truly existent as contrasted with that which is an visual aspect merely. Because that which is to the full existent must, for Plato, be fixed, lasting, and unchanging, he identified the existent with the ideal kingdom of being as opposed to the physical universe of going ( Internet ) .
Before we are born, our souls stay in the in unseeable universe and saw all the & # 8220 ; Forms & # 8221 ; of all things. The & # 8220 ; Form & # 8221 ; , harmonizing to Plato, is ageless, unchanging, and cosmopolitan. In the duologue between Socrates and Meno ( slave boy ) , harmonizing to Moser & # 8217 ; s book, Socrates references that
his psyche must stay ever possessed of this cognition & # 8230 ; . And if the truth of all things ever exists in the psyche, so the psyche is immortal & # 8230 ; .and seek to detect by remembrance what you do non now know, or instead what you do non retrieve ( Plato 42 ) .
The cognition alreadily has existed in us when we are born. By absorbing the information from the seeable universe into our heads, we so retrieve what we have forgotten in our old being. Since the cognition in us is from the ageless and unchanging & # 8220 ; Form & # 8221 ; , the cognition in us is unchanging and ageless. In similar to Plato & # 8217 ; s position in Meno, Plato & # 8217 ; s position in Republic has two classs of cognition. He says & # 8220 ; there are two governing powers, and that one of them is set over the rational universe, the other over the seeable & # 8221 ; ( Plato 47 ) . On that history, the cognition we have is from both our perceptual experience and our rational universe. What we perceive is non true and that is non knowledge. When we perceive something that comes in a form and has a rule, our ground will treat into hypothesis by sentiment and our psyche will acknowledge that by ground ( Plato 48 ) . Mathematical expressions can be good illustrations in this statement because mathematical expressions are ageless and unchanging. For case, before we recognize that & # 8220 ; a? +b? =c? & # 8221 ; as a hypothesis, we must hold had experience of mensurating a physical right trigon in order to do certain that hypothesis becomes true at all clip. When the hypothesis is true, it so becomes cognition. That is the process of the rational universe. The rational universe that is our cognition is ageless and unchanging. In a similar manner, the position in Theaetetus & # 8217 ; s instance, Plato believes that some true sentiments or beliefs can be knowledge. In Theaetetus, Plato thinks cognition is & # 8220 ; right sentiment with rational definition or account & # 8221 ; ( Plato 60 ) . For case, when we hold a true sentiment about a right trigon expression, we need to warrant that true sentiment by our reason ; we know that it becomes knowledge if that expression works with all instances. As a consequence, that cognition is unchanging and ageless and knowledge timelessly exists.
The difference of cognition in Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus is the grade of failings in developing the statement of happening out what cognition is. In Meno instance, Plato proves his remembrance statement by invariably inquiring inquiries and explicating geometrical infinite of a square to a slave, Meno, who has no mathematical background whatsoever. In a mean while Plato thinks, & # 8220 ; There is no instruction, but merely remembrance & # 8221 ; ( Plato 39 ) . With a series of simple geometrical diagrams and inquiries from Socrates, Plato asks Meno is able to do basic decision of each inquiry. The method proves that Meno & # 8220 ; must hold had and learned & # 8221 ; the impressions & # 8220 ; at some other times & # 8221 ; ( Plato 42 ) . In other words, Meno cognition can be recollected and learned by & # 8220 ; seting inquiries to him & # 8221 ; ( Plato 42 ) and Plato provinces that our psyche & # 8220 ; must stay obsessed & # 8230 ; knowledge & # 8221 ; ( Plato 42 ) . The thought of what we know about cognition is excessively general which is difficult to specify cognition ; therefore, that is the failing of Plato & # 8217 ; s position in Meno & # 8217 ; s instance. In differentiation to Meno & # 8217 ; s instance, in the Republic Plato develops a narrower construct of cognition. Plato believes that the cognition and perceptual experience are the same because & # 8220 ; the psyche perceives and understands & # 8221 ; ( Plato 46 ) . When we perceive things by our senses we achieve cognition ; so each of our senses unambiguously maps in its ain nature. For case, the object, such as colour, belongs to the module of sight by the visible radiation ( Plato 46 ) . Harmonizing to Jowett, & # 8220 ; general thoughts are perceived by the head entirely without the aid of the senses & # 8221 ; ( 246 ) ; & # 8220 ; The senses perceive objects of sense, but the head entirely can compare
them” and “sensations are given at birth, but truth and being, which are indispensable to knowledge, are acquired by contemplation subsequently on” ( 247 ) . That is the failing of this statement in Plato’s position in ; we do non derive cognition unless we think and rationalize. However, in Theaetetus’s instance, Plato proposes a different facet of cognition as a true sentiment or belief and a rational account ( Plato 60 ) . This position is more abstract than the other two earlier positions of Plato on cognition ; as a affair of fact, it attacks two earlier positions of Plato in Meno and Republic as the development of the theory of cognition persists. As this statement continues, Plato believes that “knowledge is true opinion” ( Plato 50 ) on the first move. A true sentiment or belief can non be tantamount to a true belief in a persuasive instance in tribunal. For case, in a jury test, the juryman believes that the suspect is guilty from the attorney’s statement instead than seeing the concrete grounds ( Plato 60 ) . In this instance, true sentiment is non ever knowledge ; that is why this statement is weak. Furthermore, when there is a true sentiment, there is besides a false sentiment that is non knowledge. In the instance of “5+7=11” , “5+7” is the object of sentiment and “=11” is non a false sentiment which “is impossible… in the domain of knowledge” ( Jowett 249 ) but it is mistaking by “a confusion of idea and sense” ( Plato 56 ) . A true sentiment must be what is the instance and the object of the sentiment must be. Furthermore, “the differences in the sorts and grades of cognition depend on the extent and the qualities of the wax” ( Jowett 258 ) . Therefore, it is agreeable that some true sentiments can be knowledge. As Plato approaches to his concluding move on his statement, he explains
in the first topographic point, the significance may be, attesting one & # 8217 ; s thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an sentiment in the watercourse which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or H2O. Does non this appear to you to be one sort of account ( Plato 61 ) .
Plato thinks that account is & # 8220 ; the contemplation of idea in speech.-But this is non curious to those who know & # 8221 ; and & # 8220 ; the numbering of the parts of a thing & # 8221 ; ( Jowett 275 ) . The failing is that it is possible for & # 8220 ; numberings of parts without knowledge & # 8221 ; ( Jowett 276 ) . However, this failing in Theaetetus & # 8217 ; s instance is non that bad comparison to other two instances ( Meno and Republic ) in footings of different grades of failing in the development of cognition theory.
Plato & # 8217 ; s late position in Theaetus is superior to all of his early positions in Meno and Republic. In Meno, Plato & # 8217 ; s position falls short on his statement of remembrance because this seeable universe has nil to make with the unseeable universe. If there were another universe beside our universe, it would hold nil to make with our cognition. In a sense, if we need mensurate how much cognition we, we can barely state our cognition at certain grade when state of affairss may originate to us instance by instance because every instance is non the same. For about the same thing in Meno & # 8217 ; s instance, in Republic, Plato & # 8217 ; s position is deficient ; our senses can non give us knowledge when we hear people talking different linguistic communications that we have ne’er learned and when we see prestidigitators executing semblances. In these instances, we do non understand what people are speaking about in foreign linguistic communications and the semblances deceive our eyes ; as a consequence, our senses and perceptual experiences do non give us knowledge. On the other manus, Plato & # 8217 ; s position in Theaetetus is stronger as we see in our universe today. A true sentiment can be understood as a hypotheses ; a rational account is the experiment of the hypothesis. When a hypothesis matches with a rational account, a big possibility that it can go theory. When we know the theory and we can explicate it, so we have knowledge. This statement in Theaetetus has less failing than other statements in his earlier positions ( Meno and Republic ) . Likewise, we can be certain how much we know at least in a certain grade. For case, if we take a math trial, we can mensurate how many rules, theories, and expression we have learned. For that ground, Theaetetus is more concrete than other two earlier positions although Socrates is non satisfied at all with Plato & # 8217 ; s positions in Meno, Republic and Theatetus about the definition of cognition.
After comparing and contrast Plato & # 8217 ; s positions in Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus, I find that the similarity is the singularity of cognition in Plato & # 8217 ; s statement. I besides find that the differences are the grade of failings of each of his position. I think Plato presents a strong statement on we define cognition. In Theaetetus & # 8217 ; s instance, realistically we can state that we have some grades of cognition by holding trials ; I think this statement is the best. This definition of cognition, I think, can use to our universe today. Most significantly, cognition is involved non merely in what we learn, but besides in what interpret and procedure from what we learn in our head.
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Jowett, B. The Dialogues of Plato Translated into English with Analyses and
Introductions. New York: MacMillan and Co, 1892.
Plato. & # 8220 ; Meno. & # 8221 ; & # 8220 ; Republic. & # 8221 ; and & # 8220 ; Theatetus. & # 8221 ; Eds. Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander
Nat. Human Knowledge Classical and Contemporary Approaches. New York:
Oxford University Press 1995.
& # 8220 ; Ron & # 8217 ; s Palace. & # 8221 ; Feb 13 2000.
