Pearl Harbor: Intelligence Failure Essay Sample
* Throughout clip. many published plants have criticized the Nipponese onslaught on Pearl Harbor on December 7. 1941. with many bookmans imputing the onslaught to a failure of the United States of America’s military intelligence. Initially. this decision seems sensible seeing as it is extremely unlikely that the United States military. one of the most advanced of its clip. could pretermit to recognize that a Nipponese force was progressing on the central office of its Pacific Naval fleet. An intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor was caused by the fact that Washington Navy and Army functionaries failed to properly distribute available intelligence. do educated determinations based on unevaluated intelligence studies. take every defensive step when beginnings suggested a Nipponese surprise onslaught and use all intelligence beginnings due to a heavy dependence on MAGIC intelligence. *
When states want to pass on with foreign embassies they want to keep security so that other states are non cognizant of their political or hawkish purposes. They encrypt their communications. The US cracked the Japanese cypher which was codification named purple. and began to listen in on diplomatic traffic. The interlingual renditions of the information they gained from this traffic. they code-named MAGIC. *
* An of import portion of the United States intelligence assemblage before December 7. 1941 was code-named MAGIC. MAGIC was extremely classified diplomatic communicating between the Nipponese authorities and its foreign embassadors and consulates. Once American cryptanalysts were able to decrypt this Nipponese information. which was code-named “PURPLE” . listening Stationss in the Philippines and Hawaiian Islands were able to stop. record. and translate full messages. These translated messages so were so code-named and referred to by the United States of America as MAGIC. Obtaining MAGIC gave the United States an advantage when it came to dialogues between the two states sing the economic countenances that the United States of America had placed on Japan. United States functionaries were able to pre-empt Tokyo’s negotiating scheme. Despite the advantages that MAGIC provided for the U. S. Army and Naval services. really few Washington functionaries had entree to MAGIC intelligence. The Navy reported its intelligence to the undermentioned functionaries:
1. The Director of Naval Intelligence
2. Head of the Far East subdivision of the Office of Naval Intelligence ( ONI )
3. Head of the War Plans Section
4. Adjunct Chief of Naval Operations
5. Head of Naval Operations. Harold R. Stark
6. Secretary of the Navy
7. Naval Aid to the President
8. The President
The army’s signal intelligence was seen by:
1. Adjunct head of the G-2 staff
2. The Chief of War Plans
3. Head of Staff
4. Secretary of War
5. Secretary of State
Merely 13 Washington functionaries had entree to MAGIC. doing it highly secure. Unfortunately. this meant that merely one individual could analyse the messages at a clip. and: “It was. in consequence. doing each of the top functionaries his ain intelligence officer… what he was having was natural. unevaluated intelligence. It had non been processed in any mode except for the decryption and translating… . ”
The varying analyses of MAGIC informations complicated affairs when it came to diplomatic dealingss with Japan: “Only if each of the receivers of “MAGIC” were an expert on Japan. knew the Nipponese manner of thinking…the comparative power and aspirations of the ground forces and the naval forces and the royal family…were aware of the critical demands of the economic system for oil and altogether materials…would it have been possible for him to change over the Nipponese traffic into difficult intelligence. ”
Those interpreting Charming intelligence were non experts on any of these subjects. and hence Army and Navy functionaries interpreted and responded to intelligence to the best of their abilities. The failure of these leaders was non needfully based on the determinations that they made as a consequence of their analysis. but the fact that their analysis was frequently defective. as they knew small about the capable affair.
Due to the antecedently discussed stiff security environing MAGIC. many persons who could hold made usage of this intelligence were denied it. Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of all intelligence related to the Pacific Fleet at Honolulu. and hence should hold had entree to all Naval intelligence. Washington functionaries failed to allow him such entree. as “ [ they ] did non entirely trust the security agreements of U. S. field commands…thus the reluctance to direct massages to Hawaii or the Philippines. ” In add-on to this:
“The intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet in Honolulu discovered that such messages existed and requested that transcripts be sent to him. but this petition was turned down by Washington. The ground for the limited distribution was security. ”
The fright that MAGIC information could be compromised by a security rear of barrel outweighed the logic of supplying information to those functionaries that needed it the most.
Reliance on MAGIC as a chief beginning of intelligence was besides a failure of the United States of America’s leading. * “It is most improbable that anybody presumed to state President Roosevelt or Harry Hopkins. or Secretaries Cordell Hull. Frank Knox or Henry L. Stimson. about what
information could or could non be obtained from communications intelligence. or that it was one beginning and should be evaluated in concurrence with all other available beginnings. ” *
* Once cryptologists cracked the PURPLE codification and began decrypting MAGIC messages. Washington believed they had found their one in the hole. However. the possible defects of MAGIC were non decently addressed. As stated by __Lyman B. Kirkpatrick. Jr. in Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II“…did they believe that the Nipponese embassadors in Washington would have a message stating We are traveling to assail Pearl Harbor tomorrow at morning? ” In add-on to this. W *
* ashington’s dependence on MAGIC was so strong that they ne’er considered the possibility that non all of Japan’s programs would be transmitted to their diplomats and that possibly their diplomats were deliberately being kept in the dark. “The Americans did non appreciate that the two embassadors in Washington…could be used as dupes… In fact. they knew little more about their country’s war programs than the Americans” Another illustration of MAGIC dependence came on Wednesday. November 26. 1941. Admiral Kimmel. Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet based at Pearl Harbor. received a study that had been sent from the wireless intelligence unit in Hawaii. It stated that a big concentration of Nipponese pigboats and bearer aircraft had amassed in the Marshall Islands. This likely meant that aircraft bearers were portion of the group every bit good. Kimmel besides received MAGIC intelligence messages that indicated that all Nipponese bearers were in place Waterss.
Any indicant of a hawkish Nipponese force approaching an American Naval base should hold been taken really earnestly. nevertheless Kimmel ignorantly relied on MAGIC information. which did non bespeak any studies of Nipponese Naval activity in the Marshall Islands. and hence no farther probe took topographic point. It is likely that the Pearl Harbor onslaught could hold been averted if it had. Another case of MAGIC dependence occurred when Admiral Kimmel received a study that Nipponese consuls in Far Eastern states every bit good as in London and Washington had been ordered to destruct their secret paperss and codifications. Kimmel was besides cognizant that the Nipponese consulate in Honolulu was firing secret paperss.
Kimmel ignored the local consulate’s actions based upon MAGIC studies telling consulates in other locations to make the same thing. He felt that Nipponese consulates were merely doing readying for Japan to stop diplomatic dialogues with the United States. However. military functionaries have called the actions of local Nipponese consulate an “unmistakeable tip-off” . because: “If you rupture diplomatic dialogues you do non needfully hold to fire your codifications. The diplomats…can battalion up their codes…and take them place. Besides. when you rupture diplomatic dialogues. you do non tear consular dealingss. The consuls stay on. Now in this peculiar set of despatchs that did non intend a rupture of diplomatic dialogues. it meant war…”
Admiral Ingersoll. who served as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet from 1942 to 1944. argued that Nipponese consulates in Honolulu. London. and Washington were non fixing to stop diplomatic dealingss. If that were the instance. they would non necessitate to be destructing their secret paperss. His statement suggests that they were fixing for war. Admiral Kimmel failed to see this. and. as a consequence. the fleet at Pearl Harbor was non every bit prepared to support itself. Another illustration of MAGIC trust was found in respects to a message sent on November 15. 1941. The message ordered the Nipponese consulate in Honolulu to increase the regularity of studies on the location of Pearl Harbor war vessels to twice a hebdomad.
Admiral Stark had received intelligence messages old to this. the lone difference being that Tokyo had requested that studies be sent more often. and that similar orders had been given to consulates located “on the West Coast and Panama. ” Stark assumed that this petition from Tokyo was merely an act of Nipponese diligence and required no farther attending. * Had Stark recognized that the petition for more regular studies may hold been related to the increased inter-country anxiousness between Japan and the United States he may hold been alerted to the possibility that Japan’s could assail Pearl Harbor. As a consequence of the trust on MAGIC intelligence. as opposed to American messages. many indispensable defensive steps were non taken that could hold prevented the black conflict at Pearl Harbor.
* General Walter Short was in charge of the Hawaii division of the American Army in 1941. The occupations of Short and Kimmel were intertwined – it was Short’s nonsubjective to protect the fleet at Pearl Harbor. while Admiral Kimmel was responsible for maintaining the fleet conflict ready at all times. Kimmel worked with Short in defense mechanism of the fleet and besides provided long scope reconnaissance. In carry oning these undertakings. both work forces failed to take every possible defensive step when intelligence suggested the possibility of an onslaught on Pearl Harbor. Both Short and Kimmel knew that a war spurred by a Nipponese onslaught was extremely likely. and that it would most probably be a surprise. Kimmel himself wrote. “I feel that a surprise onslaught ( pigboat. air. or combined ) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. ” Besides. “The March 31. 1941. Martin-Bellinger Report likewise noted that “ [ I ] n the past Orange [ Japan ] has ne’er preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war. ”
Both work forces were cognizant that on April 1st. 1941. Naval Intelligence in Washington alerted Hawaii that Axis Powers have frequently started onslaughts on either a Saturday or a Sunday. nevertheless. “Although his work forces trained hard during the hebdomad. Kimmel kept a significantly lower province of preparedness on weekends…” Ge
neral Short had besides read the Martin-Bellinger study. and hence was cognizant that a surprise onslaught was a possibility. On December 2nd. 1941. Lt. Cdr. Edwin T. Layton. Kimmel’s intelligence officer. briefed Admiral Kimmel that there had been no radio traffic from four Nipponese aircraft bearers “for to the full 15 and perchance 20 days” . The location of the four bearers was unknown. No farther probe took topographic point. Both Kimmel and Short received messages from Washington on November 27th. 1941 warning that an aggressive move from Japan could happen “within the following few days” . Both Kimmel and Short knew that if Pearl Harbor was attacked. aircraft bearers were a possibility. As stated by the Secretary of the Navy to both Kimmel and Short: “The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and chance are considered to be:
1 ) Air bombing onslaught
2 ) Air torpedo onslaught
3 ) Sabotage
4 ) Submarine onslaught
5 ) Mining
6 ) Barrage by gunfire”
Despite the presentment by the Secretary that air bombardment and air topedo onslaughts were considered top precedence for defense mechanism. Kimmel issued orders to the fleet to “exercise utmost watchfulness against pigboats in operating areas…” . General Short ordered Alert Number 1. which was an qui vive against sabotage. Neither Short nor Kimmel took readyings to support against the most likely signifier of Nipponese onslaught: an onslaught from the air. Because of General Short’s accent on defense mechanism against sabotage. speedy defense mechanism against an air onslaught was impossible. All of the ammo for the anti-aircraft guns was under lock and cardinal. intending that no anti-aircraft guns were operational when Nipponese planes began the onslaught. If Short and Kimmel had conducted their defensive steps based on the appraisal sent to them from the Secretary of the Navy. the Pearl Harbor onslaught could hold been better defended. Even Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. the Commander-in-Chief of the Nipponese Combined Naval Fleet. was prepared for far greater defensive steps than what Kimmel or Short had set up. as:
“Admiral Yamamoto expected his forces to be detected. In November 1941 he told…100 Nipponese officers on the flight deck of the Akagi that although we hope to accomplish surprise. everyone should be prepared for terrific American resistance…You may hold to contend your manner in…”
Short and Kimmel knew a figure of things that should hold spurred them to take greater defensive action against the possibility of onslaught. yet both work forces failed to establish a proper degree of defensive watchfulness based on the information they had.
The onslaught at Pearl Harbor has frequently been attributed to an intelligence failure. This is right. nevertheless Japan and the U. S. were on a crash class with each other as a consequence of a failure to step off from their deep-rooted policies and beliefs. “The Nipponese were determined to prosecute their imperial aspirations in the Pacific. and the Americans were determined to halt them. ” When the diplomats of either state were committed to these policies and classs of action. there is small that signals intelligence or MAGIC could hold done other than listen to how those actions or policies ran their class. Intelligence could merely number down until the Pacific War began ; it was inevitable. What was non inevitable was Washington’s failure to decently administer intelligence that was available due to stiff security steps.
Because Washington received natural. unevaluated intelligence studies. its functionaries had to analyse it themselves. which created multiple one-man intelligence bureaus. This meant determinations had to be made based on stuff that certain functionaries knew small or nil about. Army and Navy functionaries failed to take every possible defensive step when multiple beginnings suggested that a Nipponese surprise onslaught was a possibility. The U. S. authorities failed in the sense that it developed a heavy dependence on MAGIC intelligence. and in making so did non give other intelligence beginnings the attending that they required. After look intoing these failures it is clear that although War in the Pacific was inevitable. the desolation of the December 7th. 1941 onslaught on Pearl Harbor was non.
Plants Cited
Alvarez. David J. . Secret messages: codebreaking and American diplomatic negotiations. 1930-1945. Lawrence. KS: University Press of Kansas. 2000. Borch. Frederic L. . and Daniel Martinez. Kimmel. Short. and Pearl Harbor: the concluding study revealed. Annapolis. Md. : Naval Institute Press. 2005. Dupuy. Colonel T. N. . “Pearl Harbor: Who Blundered? | American History Lives at American Heritage. ” American History Lives at American Heritage. hypertext transfer protocol: //www. americanheritage. com/content/pearl-harbor-who-blundered ( accessed November 8. 2012 ) . Kirkpatrick. Lyman B. . Captains without eyes ; intelligence failures in World War II. New York: Macmillan. 1969. Wohlstetter. Roberta. Pearl Harbor ; warning and determination. Stanford. Calif. : Stanford University Press. 1962.
