A Dsicussion Of The Relative Merits Of

Locke And Leibniz Essay, Research Paper

Rene Descartes ( 1641 ) exerted a enormous influence on developments in the Fieldss of doctrine and scientific discipline. The Frenchman was said to be an rational mastermind whose scholarly parts extended from philosophical guess and pure mathematics to the physiology of the carnal organic structure. Descartes is regarded by some historiographers as one of the laminitiss of modern epistemology. Dissatisfied with the deficiency of understanding among philosophers, he saw the demand for a new philosophical method & # 8211 ; a method every bit strict as mathematics itself. He began by oppugning everything which failed to go through the trial of his standard of truth & # 8211 ; the clarity and sharpness of thoughts. It was his purpose to subject every idea to prove, every idea to doubt. Reasoned by Descartes: though I might doubt everything, I can non reasonably uncertainty that I, the thought skeptic, exist as a RESs cogitans ( believing substance ) . And therefore evolved the celebrated Cartesian apothegm: Cogito, ergo amount ( I think hence I am ) . This Descartes offered as an immediate intuition of his ain thought head. Descartes was a synergistic dualist, as he argued that a organic structure without a psyche would be an mechanization, wholly under the mechanistic control of external stimulations and its internal hydraulic or & # 8220 ; emotional & # 8221 ; status & # 8211 ; and wholly without consciousness. On the other manus, a psyche or head without a organic structure would hold consciousness, but merely of the innate thoughts ; it would miss the centripetal feelings and thoughts of material things that occupy normal human consciousness most of the clip. Thus the organic structure presumptively adds profusion to the contents of the psyche & # 8217 ; s consciousness, while the psyche adds reason and will to the causes of behavior. Therefore, Descartes believed that behavior is non the consequence of head or organic structure moving entirely, but the many different possible sorts of interactions between the two. Therefore, Descartes had assurance in his clear and distinguishable thoughts refering the material universe. Other philosophers, nevertheless, came bit by bit to take a firm stand that adult male could see physical substance and causal jurisprudence indirectly and, on juncture, by illation merely. They believed that what was needed was critical self-inspection and analysis of the content of experience, with peculiar emphasis on the beginning and development of thoughts. This psycho-philosophical analysis was attempted by three philosophers. The German philosophers, Leibniz and Kant developed a modified signifier of rationalism which consisted of a logical disquisition on the manners of activity by which the head maps. In England, Locke attempted to follow the beginning of thoughts to existent experience and to unwrap the Torahs which underlie the organisation of these elements of the mind.` `John Locke ( 1690 ) is considered to be the first great British empiricist who declared that there were no unconditioned thoughts and that all adult male & # 8217 ; s cognition of the universe comes from the senses. For Locke the head at birth is a tabula rasa ( clean slate ) , except for the few feelings formed during antenatal being. Thus, even the most abstract thoughts, such as power, eternity, individuality, and substance, arise from experience. Evidence for this premise, Locke maintained, is based upon the facts that kids are wholly incognizant of the most universally recognized beliefs. In add-on, he supported the unusually prophetic thought that the probe of rare instances of big recovery of sight following inborn sightlessness would cast visible radiation on the development of human perceptual experience. Locke considered two elemental sorts of experience: thoughts of esthesis and thoughts of contemplation, either of which may be simple or complex. The former arise in the separate senses and indicate the being of an external physical universe, while thoughts of contemplation arise from the & # 8220 ; perceptual experience of the operations of our ain heads within us. & # 8221 ; Furthermore, the happening of brooding idea implies the presence of a religious psyche, presumptively the kernel of life with which adult male is born. Galileo & # 8217 ; s differentiation between primary and secondary qualities was given farther consideration by Locke. Primary qualities & # 8211 ; or extension, figure, gesture, remainder, solidness, and figure & # 8211 ; green goods in adult male thoughts resembling the physical universe which excites them ; whereas the secondary qualities are & # 8220 ; nil in the objects themselves, but powers to bring forth assorted esthesiss in us by their primary qualities & # 8221 ; ( e.g. , gustatory sensation, coloring material, sound, odor ) . Locke & # 8217 ; s believing led him to the impression of association theory, gestating of complex thoughts as the combination of simple 1s. While the association of thoughts ( a phrase coined by Locke ) or, instead, combination of simple thoughts was discussed to some extent in footings of & # 8220 ; pleasance, & # 8221 ; & # 8220 ; natural correspondence, & # 8221 ; & # 8220 ; opportunity, & # 8221 ; and & # 8220 ; usage, & # 8221 ; definite constitution of the philosophy is credited to later authors. In early 1697, the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ( 1646-1716 ) tried unsuccessfully to acquire in touch with Locke ( 1632-1704 ) . Liebniz had read and been impressed by Locke & # 8217 ; s recent book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which discussed the nature of human cognition from an empiricist & # 8217 ; s point of position, mentioned above. But Leibniz had besides felt that Locke & # 8217 ; s empiricist philosophy had gone excessively far, and overlooked the function of several of import belongingss innate to the head. Despite their theoretical differences, Leibniz and Locke had much in common. Both had highly broad involvements, runing from history and economic sciences to science and faith. Both had rejected chances to prosecute academic callings in favor of engagement in the & # 8220 ; existent universe & # 8221 ; of political relations and public personal businesss. Politicss so being mostly the sphere of the affluent nobility, both of these middle-class work forces had had to work as courtiers. Besides, both had tried to incorporate their political thoughts with a larger and general doctrine of head, derived in portion from the earlier work of Descartes. Although both Locke and Leibniz were greatly influenced by Descartes, each had reacted for and against different facets of his system, therefore heading in different waies. Locke had accepted many of Descartes & # 8217 ; s basic thoughts sing natural philosophies and physiology, while strenuously rejecting the impression of a cons

tantly active conscious soul, brought into the world with a ready-made supply of innate ideas. Leibniz, by contrast, strongly objected to aspects of Descartes’s physics. On logical grounds, he disputed that infinitely divisible material particles could ever be taken as the ultimate units of reality. Leibniz thought there must be forces or energies that produce the impressions of matter in motion. He did agree with Descartes about the unquestionable reality of the conscious soul, however, and therefore concluded that the ultimate “substance” of the universe must be some consciousness-bearing, soul-like entity which precedes all apprehension of the physical world. Thus he proposed a philosophy of mind emphasizing the nativist and rationalist tendencies of Descartes. Leibniz saw these differences as not so much contradicting Locke, as filling in details on points left implicit or unspoken by the Englishman. Locke had seen two sources of ideas, in the sensations of the external world and the reflections on the mind’s own operations, but had not much elaborated on the latter. Leibniz argued that many of the innate tendencies and dispositions he himself emphasized were implicit in Locke’s notion of reflection. In discussing precisely the same mathematical and logical proofs in which Leibniz had seen evidence for innate “necessary truths,” Locke had seen evidence of “intuitive and demonstrative knowledge,” with a higher order of certainty than “sensitive knowledge.” Locke took for granted the mind’s own activity in processing its sensations, showing a large number of important and interesting features under the general term “reflection.” Leibniz chose to emphasize and elaborate on these features. Also, another difference was that Locke insisted the mind is not constantly active, and can sometimes be without thoughts just as the body can be without movement. On the other hand, Leibniz believed that the mind is constantly active, even during such states as dreamless sleep. From Locke and Leibniz have developed two major and often competing traditions in the history of psychology. The empiricist, Lockean tradition has been particularly influential in English and American psychologies, which have emphasized the role of experience in forming the mind, and the functions of the mind in learning to predict and control events in the external, peripheral environment. The Leibnizean tradition, relatively stronger in Germanic countries, has placed greater emphasis on the controlling and central functions of an active and innately given mind. Although Locke appeared to go in one hypothetical “direction” and Leibniz went in the other, Kant supported much of Leibniz’s theories, and therefore headed in a similar direction to him. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) trained in the Leibizean tradition of German philosophy, and the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) aroused the “intellectually slumbering” Kant. Lockean empiricism and associationism to an extreme and questioning the logical status of the concept of causality – our intuitive belief that certain events have been directly “caused by” certain other previous events. Kant responded to Hume by proposing a variation of Leibniz’s nativist argument. He argued that since causality cannot be proven to exist in the external world, it is a part of our experience which we are unable to escape. It must therefore represent an innate contribution of the mind. Kant also proposed an external (or noumenal) world, which consists of raw reality or objects in a “pure” state, independent of human experience. This world is then transformed into the inner (or phenomenal) world when it encounters the human mind, which carries out this transformation.Kant believes that human beings never directly experience the pure reality of things-in-themselves, but a series of “appearances” that are partly formed by the creative mind in the external world. Thus, the mind for Kant does not just passively reflect or record the external world, but actively participates in each person’s experience of the world. Kant therefore supports Leibniz at this point, and refutes Locke’s theory that the mind is passive. Although Kant often appears to take the view point of Leibniz over that of Locke, he was at one time driven back towards Locke. In 1762, Kant expressed the opinion that an animal may have clear and distinct ideas without necessarily attaining to reason; there is a fundamental difference between distinguishing things from one another and knowing the distinction between things. If this is so, we are able to detect qualitative differences in the contents of our mind, and we are compelled to separate the natural or physical process, which results in a distinct image from the other logical activity which leads to the inner recognition of the distinction itself. This theory was then applied to Kant’s idea of the soul. Rational psychology was founded on the idea of the soul as a possible object of a sensuous experience. Kant rejected this, whereas Locke did not, demonstrating their differing views once again. Kant saw that it was not possible to speak of the soul which entered into relation with a system of pre-existing things. Therefore, it can be seen at a glance, that after Descartes, Locke took British empiricism in one direction and Leibniz and Kant took German idealists in another direction. Looking closely at the three influential philosophers, Kant supports certain areas of Locke’s theories and argues against those areas of Leibniz’s theories. Thus it cannot be concluded that Locke heads in a completely separate direction to Leibniz and Kant. Although it could be stated that all three travel part of the journey in a similar direction and then depart, heading in different directions. ` ` ` `APPENDIX. Peters, R. S. (1962) Brett’s History of Psychology, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Capretta, P. J. (1967) A History Of Psychology In Outline, New York: Delta Publishing. Murphy, G. and Kovach, J. K. (1972) Historical Introduction To `Modern Psychology, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited. Fancher, R. E. (1990) Pioneers Of Psychology, London: W. W. Norton & Company. Leahey, T. H. (1990) A History Of Psychology, London.