Accountability Of Our Government Essay Research Paper

Accountability Of Our Government Essay, Research Paper

Accountability of Our Government

Accountability is the kernel of our democratic signifier of authorities. It

is the liability assumed by all those who exercise authorization to account for the

mode in which they have fulfilled duties entrusted to them, a

liability finally to the Canadian people owed by Parliament, by the

authorities and therefore, every authorities section and bureau.

One of the cardinal principals of a democratic society is the

authorities must be accountable to the people. Such answerability in Canada is

exercised through Parliament. Every Minister is finally accountable for

their portfolio to Parliament and hence in bend responsible to the Canadian

electorate. The realisation of this duty is undertaken upon the

premise of office. Accountability within authorities is a step that is

used to command the maltreatment of power by those elected as authorities

representatives. & # 8220 ; The authorities must be able to command and protect its ain

rank to be able meaningfully to accept duty for its way

and impact as a government. & # 8221 ; Without answerability we are left with a powerful

political construction that has the ability to move without scruples or damages

and this does non stand for a modern democracy. With any treatment which

focal points on duty within parliament, one can see the varying degrees of

answerability and the troubles which arise when trying to depict

power, within the Canadian political system. Accountability in the populace

service can be studied from two different positions. The civil retainer who

represents the bureaucratic sector and the curate bespeaking the political

sphere. The issue of answerability raises several cardinal inquiries and questions

for societal scientists. Is the power of the civil retainer increasing while

ministerial duty is diminishing? What effects if any does this have on

the bureaucratic system? How does Parliament strike legislative control over

the bureaucratism? In kernel, who is accountable to the Canadian people?

Ministerial Duty

Curates in Canada are elected senior members of parliament who are

appointed to a departmental portfolio by the Prime Minister. These offices are

the constitutional caput of all public bureaus, runing from Department of

National Defense to Department of Human Resources. Each portfolio has a deputy

curate and a squad of senior civil retainers who advise the curate on a

assortment of issues runing from administrative processs to policy deduction.

Because a curate is normally non specialized in his portfolio he normally has to

rely to a great extent on information acquired from his senior functionaries. Therefore

Ministerial duty is closely tied to administrative officials.

It may turn out good, at this clip, to sketch general processs for

policy devising and execution. Cabinet is the signifier in which new governmental

constabularies are developed. These policies are so conveyed to individual

sections through the curates. The execution and feedback of these

policies is so the duty of civil retainers.

There are two chief types of ministerial duty: Corporate and

single.

Corporate duties refers to the answerability of Government

to Parliament. The corporate cabinet duty ensures the solidarity of

Government. & # 8220 ; Curates must be supportive of all cabinet policies while at the

same clip quell unfavorable judgments of single departments. & # 8221 ; With collective

duty a curate must be supportive of all cabinet policies regardless

of single concerns particularly in public. The authorities can therefore

present policies to Parliament with one corporate voice. This solidarity

enables authorities to support single curate in the House of Commons and

protect its right to regulate.

The authorities & # 8217 ; s corporate duty is to hold the assurance of

Parliament at all times. If at any clip this assurance is questioned the

regulating party must be subjected to a ballot in Parliament. Failure to win the

ballot requires the authorities to either resign or fade out Parliament.

Corporate duty enables the authorities to lift, set Forth policy and

resign as one corporate unit.

Three related regulations form the philosophy of corporate duty: that

authorities should stand or fall as one & # 8220 ; disposal & # 8221 ; ( and non re-make itself

out of the same assembly and seek to win a ballot of assurance ) ; that the

disposal speaks officially to Parliament with one voice, and that curates

jointly resign or the authorities asks for disintegration if defeated in the

Parks on affairs of assurance.

This is one step in which Government can be held accountable to the

people. Troubles will originate in seeking to convert back benchers to

basically vote themselves into the unemployment line, nevertheless if the

authorities fails to go through a? significant & # 8217 ; measure nowadays that is consider a ballot

of non-confidence. Resistance parties besides use this answerability step to

heighten public consciousness of questionable authorities patterns or policies.

Individual ministerial duty can be divided into two sub-

constituents. First a curate must reply to Parliament for any incorrect behaviors

that is done by their section while at the same clip support the actions of

their section. These two elements combined guarantee that Curates are

finally held accountable for their portfolios. This is particularly held true

when affairs that are done decently under his instructions or in conformity with

governmental policy.

Normally what happens though, if a departmental error is brought to the

attending of a Minister he normally denies any precognition hence asseverating

no personal incrimination. Whenever an issue is brought up that has difficult grounds

refering Ministerial cognition, the curate would normally fault it upon his

functionaries and replies to Parliament with the fact that the person

responsible will be disciplined. This is non to state that at that place have been

times in Canadian history where a Minister has made an serious mistake refering

his section and has been disciplined consequently. Politicss normally takes

take control over such issues. Rather or non the issue is of import to electors,

the magnitude of it and popularity of the Minister. As S. L. Sutherland

indicates & # 8220 ; Resignations are non a perfect index of the quality of

answerability mechanisms in responsible authorities & # 8230 ; & # 8221 ;

The job arises are describe earlier, the convention of corporate

duty will normally take consequence. Therefore this mechanisms of

answerability may really good merely damage the credibleness of a Minister. If this

is the instance it goes without stating though, at clip of elections, the tribunal of

the public sentiment will go through opinion. & # 8220 ; A curate can & # 8217 ; t perchance cognize

everything which is done in the Department by every last civil Servant and

therefore it would be folly to seek and feign that the Minister will lay eyes on

accountable and must vacate when someplace down the line at the terminal of a

corridor the 10 1000th individual committed something illegal or contrary to

Government criterions or norms. & # 8221 ;

One political convention is that when a public retainer makes a serious

error, he remains? faceless & # 8217 ; to the public oculus. This convention has it roots

in the principal of political neutrality. This is suppose to enable the civil

retainer to transport out the actions of their curate despite their ain political

positions and public sentiment on governmental policy. It is the Minister & # 8217 ; s responsibility to

respond to Parliamentary petition refering the actions of his subsidiaries but

they can non call the functionary or functionaries who may hold cause a error. It

goes without stating that since civil retainers bask this privilege and calling

promotions are based upon virtue, any political moving ridges that they may of created

will decidedly hold weight to some grade. There are of class have been

exclusions in history of where a Minister has decided to beckon this right of

namelessness. Two noteworthy instances include 1989 episode which involved the curate

of conveyance, Benoit Bouchard and in 1982 where the deputy curate of finance

resigned.

In world a curate can non be held wholly accountable for the actions

of their sections. With the tendency of downsizing the cabinet in recent

authoritiess, and cabinet shufflings the norm, there is no manner that a curate can

of all time be specialized in conformity to the portfolio that they hold.. A curate

can non be expected to cognize the day-to-day operations of his portfolio. Therefore he

must trust heavy on his senior staff. Thus, policy execution particularly

from a curate late appointed, is constitutional on what he is told from the

senior permeating staff. Therefore Ministerial responsibly is closely tied to

section senior functionaries. In fact in the history of Canada there merely have

been two curates who have resigned over mal-administration of their portfolio.

Henry Stevens resigned for the Bennett Conservative authorities in 1934 because

the Prime Minister publically condemned Stevens & # 8217 ; actions as chair of the Royal

Commission of Price Spreads and Mass Buying ; and John Fraser resigned from the

Mulroney Conservative authorities in 1985 because he had intervened in the

departmental review procedure.

The 2nd compound of Ministerial duty is that a curate

must explicate the actions of their section to Parliament. This is done

through inquiry and reply period. The curate is the & # 8220 ; constitutional

mouthpiece through which section actions will be defended or repudiated and

signifier

whom information is sought. The curate is the exclusive representative to the

House and the focal point in the House for those seeking replies and redress. & # 8221 ; This

answerability is the most of import component to the Canadian populace. It allows

the media, resistance parties and finally the elector to obtain information

refering current governmental policies. It should be noted though that

curate do non hold to react to oppugn nor give ground for non reacting.

Because Minister are constitutionally accountable for their sections this is

the exclusion and non the norm. This conventions allows backbenchers, and

resistance parties to turn to concerns that their components may hold that

where non satisfactory answered through the normal bureaucratic channels.

As the gap quotation mark indicates all elected functionaries must be held

accountable if the authorities waste public financess, break the jurisprudence or violate

citizen & # 8217 ; s rights. Voters want person to be held accountable and if the

curates do non take public incrimination than it normally falls to the public retainers.

However, political conventions that protect civil retainers individuality raises the

inquiry as to instead or non they excise power without a true answerability.

It comes down to three things that authorities can make to modulate bureaucratic

influence. & # 8220 ; Debates, inquiries, and other processs in the legislative assembly ;

Reliance on certain? ticker Canis familiaris & # 8217 ; bureaus that report straight or indirectly to

the legislative assembly ; and the usage of legislative committees. & # 8221 ;

Deputy Minister Accountability

Departments are the public bureaus that are cardinal to the authorities

and responsible for the day-to-day operation of this organic structure. The sections are

portfolios officially headed by single curates. & # 8220 ; Departments are therefore

distinguished from any other type of governmental organic structure by the fact that each is

lawfully under the direct control of a responsible minister. & # 8221 ; Due to clip

restraints and a heavy work burden curates have the support of deputies to

shoulder some the managerial facets of the portfolio. & # 8220 ; Curates are members

of a political party, constituency representatives, members of the Cabinet and

its commissions and members of Parliament. & # 8221 ; Deputy curates are appointed by

the Prime Minister and are in charge of the disposal of the policies

handed down the curate of the peculiar departmental office. The deputy & # 8217 ; s

concerns, in fact, should mirror those of his curate and must be held

straight accountable to him. In all instances they are responsible for exerting

the curate & # 8217 ; s authorization.

What happens if a deputy curate is in struggle with the policies he

must administrate at the petition of the curate? Regardless of what policies a

curate delegates to a deputy curate and whether his deputy supports the

proposals or non, the curate is held personally accountable to Cabinet,

authorities, Parliament and the Canadian electorate. & # 8220 ; Ministers hence must

be able to guarantee themselves that actions carried out under their authorization are

in conformity with the demands of the responsible exercising of power. & # 8221 ; In

the concatenation of bid the curate is finally responsible for the actions of

his support staff including his deputy curate. The deputy curate is

accountable, but, it is the office of the curate that undergoes the populace

examination if a struggle ensues or a policy fails.

The Public Servants

Then the inquiry becomes, who holds the existent political power? The

reply is simple, the public retainers. These retainers are responsible for the

execution of departmental policies and are held straight accountable to

merely a little figure political members. They are the 1s who determine who will

acquire what limited authorities resources and how governmental policy will be

implemented which will hold an consequence on future governmental policy. In order

to do public retainers accountable authorization must be exercised over them by

those higher in the concatenation of bid. The trouble arises when it comes clip

to delegate single duty to public retainers for administrative

bad lucks because of the fact that so many public retainers are involved in the

determination doing procedure. Public services have continued to turn in size as with

this increased growing so to hold their duties grown in complexness.

Who are the public retainers accountable to?

Public retainers are straight accountable merely to political and

administrative higher-ups, the tribunals and to any internal governmental

governments ( e.g. cardinal bureaus ) to which answerability is required by jurisprudence

or the administrative hierarchy. They are non straight accountable to the

legislative assembly, to coerce groups, the intelligence media, or to the general populace.

However, they are by and large required to explicate their determinations to these

entities.

Acts of Parliament is one method of control over public retainers.

However the jobs arises that senior functionaries have influence over the

content of statute law. Formally, the Minister and Cabinet make a policy and

Civil Servants are responsible for the execution of that policy. Although

in consequence it is the Civil Servants who have an tremendous sum of influence over

the development and execution of policy, therefore it would be unthinkable

to keep the curates personally accountable in this sense. This does non by no

agencies implies that a Minister can non be held accountable at all.

Legislative Control

Parliament uses five methods to strike control over the bureaucratism.

They are: ? watchdog & # 8217 ; bureaus ; ombudsman ( provincially ) ; Public Service

Commission of Canada ; Auditor General and Parliamentary Committees. This paper

will look at the two most common in the public oculus: The Office of the Auditor

General and Ombudsman.

Watchdog bureaus such as the Office of Auditor General aid

legislators in the answerability of administrative officials. In peculiar the Hearer

General keeps path of bureaucratic outgos to guarantee that monies are spend

and decently recorded as allocated by Parliament. In add-on this individual

studies on the effectivity of societal plans, environmental and economic

constabularies. It should be noted that the Auditor General is the lone individual who is

allowed to describe straight to Parliament without holding to travel through a Minister.

The Auditor General must subject an one-year study to Parliament on his findings.

Because of the political neutrality of this office, this study is normally

welcomed by the media as a elaborate appraisal of governmental policies. While

at the same clip it provides the resistance in Parliament much creditable

grounds to governmental waste.

Another watchdog bureau would be that of the Ombudsman. Although

presently this office is merely on the Provincial degree. The Ombudsman

investigates any ailments about improper administrative intervention in the

bureaucratism. If a ailment is found to be valid so it is this individuals

duty to inform the bureaucratism of how to rectify the state of affairs. It is

of import to non that an ombudsman does non posses important power over

civil retainers but instead they? influences & # 8217 ; administrative officials to do alterations.

Decision

This paper took a elaborate expression at answerability in the populace sector

and political conventions associated with this topic. It has shown the

restrictions of both corporate and single ministerial duty ;

outlined bureaucratic power ; and briefly touched upon legislative control.

A curate is officially held accountable to the actions of their

portfolio. But because of ministerial dependancy upon senior civil retainers and

political conventions that in kernel protect the authorities, this

answerability is non more than a moral duty. The power of the civil

retainer is increasing going broader as Ministerial portfolios are combined

with the modern tendency of downsizing cabinet. The influential power of the civil

retainer is increased as curates are going unspecialized in their portfolios.

The lone effectual legislative answerability is done through the office

of the hearer general. With their one-year studies, they give Parliament an

insight as to the effectivity of governmental policies. Although Parliament

has no effectual manner to approve a Minister or section who & # 8217 ; s reading

of governmental policy differs from their ain. This is non to state that

authorities is beyond the agencies of entire control. History has proven, and will

continue to turn out, that in a democratic society such as Canada, that finally

curates and Parliament are held accountable in the public oculus at the clip of

elections.

Bibliography

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