Aristotle On Pleasure Essay Research Paper After
Aristotle On Pleasure Essay, Research Paper
After nine books of contemplating different facets of the human good, Aristotle uses this chance to claim contemplation as the highest signifier of pleasance. The concluding book in Nicomachean Ethical motives is concerned with pleasances: the apprehension of each sort, and why some pleasances are better than other pleasances. The book is basically divided into two chief parts, being pleasance and felicity. I will utilize Terence Irwin & # 8217 ; s interlingual rendition and subdivisions as a guiding map for my ain question, and any citation from will be taken from this text. Irwin divides the book into three subdivisions: Pleasure, Happiness: Further treatment, and Ethical motives, Moral Education and Politics. With this order in topographic point, I will travel chronologically through each claim and statement, utilizing both the text and commentaries on the text to supply an apprehension and clear up any misconceptions of the statements presented.
At 1172a20 Aristotle makes his instance for the ethical importance of pleasance. He says that non merely do & # 8220 ; we educate kids & # 8230 ; by pleasance and hurting, [ but ] enjoying and detesting the right things seems to be most of import for virtuousness of character & # 8221 ; . It because of this importance that pleasance needs to be considered. Aristotle besides cites the importance of pleasance because of the contention that surrounds it with respects to the difference about whether pleasance is the good or it is altogether base ( 1172a 28 ) .
The inquiry as to whether or non pleasance is wholly basal prevarications in the statement that & # 8220 ; since the many thin towards pleasance and are slaves to pleasances, we must take them in the contrary way, because that is the manner to make the intermediate status & # 8221 ; ( 1172a 30 ) . Anyone who offers the claim that all pleasances are altogether base would hold to be free from of all time seeking any type of pleasance, in any grade to present any kind of truth to this claim. St. Thomas Aquinas responds likewise to this in stating:
It barely seems right for people to state what they do non believe & # 8212 ; that pleasances are merely evil to retreat us from them, because in inquiries of human actions and passions we give less acceptance to words that to actions. For if a adult male does what he says is evil, he incites by his illustration more than he restrains by his word ( Aquinas, 862 ) .
Following the lead of both Aristotle and Aquinas, it becomes clearer that neither believe that it is pleasance is evil in itself. Since the basis is so laid out, and there can be no expostulation to Aristotle & # 8217 ; s naming pleasance what it is, he proceeds with his statements.
At 1172b10 Aristotle Markss that that no sound statement can turn out that pleasance is the good. He so uses Eudoxus & # 8217 ; statements as his get downing point. Eudoxus thought that pleasance is in the class of the good, and divided his ideas into three parts. For each of the parts, I will cite in full, to guarantee that the statements are non misinterpreted. In the first, he saw that those animate beings:
Both rational and non-rational seek it. ( B ) In everything, what is choiceworthy is nice, and what is most choiceworthy is supreme. ( hundred ) Each thing finds its ain good, merely as it finds its ain nutriment. ( vitamin D ) Hence, when all things are drawn to the same thing [ i.e. pleasance ] , this indicates that it is best for all. ( vitamin E ) And what is good for all, what all purpose at is the good ( 1172b 10-15 ) .
In an initial response to this, Aristotle comments that that Eudoxus & # 8217 ; statements were considered good because of the statements in themselves, but because of the character of the adult male. His 2nd statement makes the same claim from the contrary. He said that:
( a ) hurting in itself is to be avoided for all. ( B ) Similarly, so, its contrary is choiceworthy for all. ( degree Celsius ) What is most choiceworthy is what we choose non because of, or for the interest of, anything else. ( vitamin D ) And it is agreed that this is the character of pleasance, since we ne’er ask anyone what his terminal is in being pleased, on the premise that pleasance is choiceworthy in itself.
His concluding statement is merely that & # 8220 ; when pleasance is added to any other good, e.g. to merely or temperate action, it makes that good more choiceworthy ; and good is increased by the add-on of itself. & # 8221 ; ( 1172b20-25 ) .
Aristotle sees the 3rd statement puting pleasance as one good among others, and being no more or less good than any other. And he is right in stating that the add-on of any good to any other good makes it more choiceworthy. He so cites the sentiment of Plato who argued that & # 8220 ; the pleasant life is more choiceworthy when combined with intelligence than it is without it ; and if the assorted [ good ] is better, pleasance is non the good, since nil can be added to the good to do is more choiceworthy & # 8221 ; ( 1172b30 ) . This seems true plenty ; that if one was to happen the good, there would be no other qualities that could do it more good, because by definition it is the good of all goods.
At 1173a he explains that there is no sound statement that proves that pleasance is non a good. This leads into the Aristotle & # 8217 ; s answer for the first two statements that Eudoxus gave. When there are sentiments that object to the thought that what everything purposes at is non good, there must be acceptance given to that statement. If things were called good by all so it would look that they are good. He so says that if both intelligent existences and existences without understanding follow this claim, how can at that place be anything in it? He besides presumes that even in the inferior animate beings that there is something that seeks its ain proper good that is superior to them.
The statement against Eudoxus about hurting besides seems to be wrong ( 1173b8 ) . It is argued that if hurting is an evil, it does non follow that pleasance is a good. The general point of the expostulation is right, but what is said in the instance that is mentioned is false. If pleasance and hurting are evils, both would necessitate to be avoided, and if both were impersonal they would either hold to be avoided wholly or every bit. Since hurting is avoided as immorality and pleasance is pursued as good, this must so be an resistance between them. Before Aristotle continues on how to specify the position of pleasance, at 1173a18, he says that if pleasance is non a quality it does non follow that it is non a good. Neither are virtuous activities or felicity qualities.
The good is defined as definite, and pleasance is indefinite. It is indefinite because it allows for grades of more or less. If it is the province of being pleased that is called definite, so it must besides keep true for conditions like justness and the other virtuousnesss, Aristotle explains before. Certain characters can be seen as more and less and virtuousnesss can be explained likewise. If the opinion of pleasance remainders on the assortment of the pleasances that there are, so the ground of the entree of grades is ignored. Some pleasances are pure while others are assorted with hurting. Aristotle references next that wellness allows for a discrepancy of grades even though it itself is definite. So he asks, why should pleasure non be the same? ( 1173a25 )
Pleasure is non definite so because of the varying grades. It is so stated that it is besides non a procedure because the good is complete and are procedures and becomings are, by definition, uncomplete. But pleasance can non suit even into the class of a procedure. 1773a 30, Aristotle says that pleasances are non speedy or decelerate, & # 8220 ; for adeptness and awkwardness seems to be proper to every process-if non in itself, so in relation to something else. But neither of these is true with pleasance & # 8221 ; . While it is as possible to go pleased rapidly as to any other emotion, it is & # 8220 ; non possible to be pleased rapidly & # 8221 ; ( 1173b1 ) . Though the Greek and English are evidently different, as an English interlingual rendition, following the proper regulations of grammar, one can non, be an adverb.
Aristotle so explains how the relation of pleasance to trouble can non be used for a procedure. Continue from his old idea, Aristotle continues to oppugn the position of pleasance. He inquiries next how pleasance can be a going. For, he says, & # 8220 ; non merely any random thing, it seems, comes to be from any other ; but what something comes to be from is what it is dissolved into. Hence whatever pleasance is the going of, hurting should be the perishing of it & # 8221 ; ( 1173b5 ) . It is said that hurting is the voidance and that pleasance is the replenishment. Because emptying and make fulling are things that happen to the organic structure, it will be the organic structure that has the pleasance. Aristotle remarks that this relation of pleasance and the organic structure seems to come from the bodily relation to nutrient. He so says that this is non true of other pleasances. His claim that pleasures in mathematics and in perceptual experiences every bit good as with memories and outlooks arise without any kind of old hurting. His inquiry is of what they would be approachs to be of. At 1173b20 he says that & # 8220 ; since no emptiness of anything has come to be, there is nil whose replenishment might come to be. & # 8221 ;
What I question at this point is what Aristotle would state to person who has sight, so loses it and so regains it once more. Because this, like aural sense or even memories are pleasances when they are at that place, even if they are non thought of such at the clip. When they cease to be, there is hurting, particularly when accompanied by the cognition or consciousness that they were one time present. If these senses are to return, as is what happens in the instance of impermanent sightlessness, hearing loss, or memory loss, there is an huge feeling of pleasance that comes with it. In the instance of a impermanent sense loss, there is an emptiness of something that had come to be. It is merely like the voidance and replenishment of the organic structure after a drawn-out period, like a fast. This does non needfully alter the result of the statement for pleasance, but it does merit observing.
Aristotle so moves to discourse the good and bad pleasances ( 1173b21 ) . Because there are some people who use the scandalous pleasances in order to show that it is non a good, it is of import to demo why these claims are non valid. His first ground is to demo that these pleasances are non pleasant except to those who claim them to be. If person is a bad individual and calls a scandalous pleasance pleasant, so there is nil to state that this is a pleasance to anyone non in that bad status. Aristotle uses appetencies and gustatory sensations of ill people to healthy people to demo that in different conditions, different people desire different repletion. His 2nd ground follows that the pleasances are choiceworthy, except when they come from scandalous beginnings. His illustration is the obvious one of wealth. The desire for money is all right, but non when it is required to make ill of another in order to acquire it. His concluding history is that pleasances could be different in different species. Pleasures that are & # 8220 ; from all right beginnings are different from those from black beginnings ; and we can non hold the merely individual & # 8217 ; s pleasance without being merely & # 8221 ; ( 1173b30 ) .
Aristotle concludes the 3rd chapter by discoursing the statement for pleasance differing in species. He uses the friend and the adulator as his illustration, saying at 1174a that & # 8220 ; the friend seems to take at what is good, but the adulator is reproached, whereas the friend is praised, on the premise that in their traffics they have different purposes & # 8221 ; . His following idea is that no 1 would take to populate with a kid & # 8217 ; s thought for his whole life while taking every bit much pleasance in what pleases kids.
There are things that people are eager to posses despite their non conveying pleasance in itself. No affair what pleasures would later follow from holding something like cognition of the virtuousnesss, holding the cognition without the pleasances would non discourage anyone from desiring it. With this said, it seems obvious that & # 8220 ; pleasance is non the good, that non every pleasance is choiceworthy in themselves, differing in species or in their beginnings [ from those that are non ] ( 1174a10 ) .
Chapter 4 begins with the elucidation that pleasance is non a procedure, and that pleasance is an activity. Following Aristotle explains that pleasance, like seeing, seems to be complete at any clip. If pleasance is like this, so it is a whole. Because its signifier can non be completed by & # 8220 ; coming to be for a longer clip & # 8221 ; ( 1174a15 ) . Again, pleasance is non a procedure.
Aristotle so gets into the account of the procedure and completions. His points consist of the thought every procedure aims at some terminal. The procedure consists of dissimilar sub-processes, and each & # 8220 ; procedure is uncomplete during the procedures that are in its parts & # 8221 ; ( 1174a20 ) . So because of all of the procedures within a procedure there is a differing in signifier at any given clip every bit good as in the whole clip. So, this means that pleasance is different from a procedure.
At 1174b 14, Aristotle attempts to explicate the nature of pleasance, and its belongingss. Pleasure is the thing that completes an activity. Every sense works in relation to the object that it is feeling. It works the best when the sense is at its finest point and the object is the finest object. Its best possible activity so is when both the sense and the object are in their perfect provinces and are in relation to each other. From 1174b 20-24, Aristotle continues on this, & # 8220 ; the pleasantest activity is the most complete ; and the most complete is the activity of the topic in good status in relation to the most first-class object of the module & # 8221 ; ( 1174b21-23 ) . When the best sense and the best object have their pleasance nowadays, because everything has its pleasance, they are complete, and it is because of the pleasance.
After set uping the perfect pleasance, Aristotle so compares the sense with the object in their excellence to wellness and a physician. Health and a physician are both causes of being healthy but in different ways. Pleasure, he continues, exist and map with the senses ; this is a given because we are cognizant that there are things that we acknowledge with our senses that are called pleasant. His following standard is besides obvious in that pleasance is best when the senses are their best. Something like the odor of a flower would non be a perfect relation if the individual with the olfactory organ had a cold and later an impaired sense of odor. He concludes that & # 8220 ; pleasance completes the activity & # 8212 ; non nevertheless, as the province does, by being present [ in the activity ] , but as a kind of attendant terminal, like the bloom on young persons & # 8221 ; ( 1174b32 ) . Aquinas wrote that at this point
He clarifies a old statement about the mode in which pleasance perfects activity. For it was stated that pleasance perfects activity non expeditiously but officially. Now, formal flawlessness is twofold. One is an intrinsic representing a thing & # 8217 ; s kernel, but the other is added to a thing already constituted in its species. He says foremost that pleasance perfects activity non as a wont that is built-in, i.e. , non as a signifier intrinsic to the kernel of the thing, but as a sort of terminal or supervenient flawlessness, like the bloom of wellness comes to immature people non as being of the kernel of young person but as following from a favourable status of the causes of young person. Likewise pleasance follows from a favourable status of the causes of the activity. ( Aquinas, p86-7 )
After doing clear his earlier points, Aristotle so goes on to discourse the belongingss of pleasance. First he looks at the
continuance of pleasance and acknowledges that it can non travel on continuously because “nothing human is capable of uninterrupted activity, and therefore, no uninterrupted pleasance arises either, since pleasance is a effect of activity” ( 1175a5 ) . Because worlds would turn tired of whatever activity was conveying them pleasance, finally they would hold to halt. Were person to maintain dance, if this were the activity that brought that individual pleasance, there would come a point when physical exhaustion would take over, and that would halt the activity from being enjoyable. Although it is the initial pleasance that is derived from any activity that continues the pursuit for it.
The following treatment begins with the thought that pleasures differ in sort. He so reiterates that the species of pleasances seem to be different. Since he has established that and established that pleasance completes an activity, it would so look the following measure to state that:
Activities that differ in species are besides completed by things that differ in species. Activities of idea differ in species from activities of the modules of perceptual experience, and so make these from each other ; so besides, so, do the pleasances that complete them ( 1175a25-30 ) .
When an activity that has a proper pleasance that is present it will better their proper map. If, for illustration, the proper pleasance of ( harmonizing to some faiths ) sexual intercourse is reproduction, so the pleasance received from the act is the proper pleasance. The activity has a formal pleasance in that it is traveling to make life, and the people involved are seeking that terminal. Because there is physical pleasance that is involved as, although wholly unneeded for reproduction, the act becomes best by this.
Alien pleasance, conversely, does the antonym. If a & # 8220 ; proper pleasance makes an activity more exact, longer and better, while an foreign pleasance amendss it, clearly the two pleasances differ widely & # 8221 ; ( 1175b15 ) . Using the same illustration, as with the proper pleasances instance for sexual intercourse for reproduction, utilizing birth control of any kind, or homosexual sex would be an foreign pleasance since it stops the proper map of the activity. The formal pleasance is gone because there is no desire for a kid, but the foreigner, physical pleasance remains and becomes the focal point of the activity. Alien pleasance is non the same as proper hurting, though the effects are similar in destructing an activity.
So so the inquiry is asked as to which pleasances are good? Because of the grades of decency and badness, there are activities that are choiceworthy and there are activities that should be avoided. From 1175b 25-30, Aristotle explains how this besides applies to pleasure, since the activity has a specific proper pleasance. This is explained in that & # 8220 ; the pleasance proper to an first-class activity is nice, and the one proper to a base activity is barbarous ; for likewise, appetencies for all right things are applaudable and appetencies for black things are blameworthy. & # 8221 ; The pleasance is more proper that the desire for an activity because desire is so close that there is frequently conflict over whether or non the two are separate constructs. So pleasures differ as activities do, and as Aristotle points out following, & # 8220 ; each sort of animate being seems to hold its ain proper map ; for the proper pleasance will be the 1 that corresponds to its activity & # 8221 ; ( 1176a1-5 ) .
As with animate beings, different sorts of worlds besides differ. Thingss that conveying pleasance to some cause hurting to others. So the proper pleasance for worlds should be measured against the first-class individual. If what the first-class individual calls disgraceful is what another calls pleasant, it is because worlds differ in goodness. Because it is a corrupt individual naming an obnoxious thing pleasant, nevertheless, it should be noticed that it is black and is merely pleasant to the corrupt individual.
At this point in the text, Aristotle moves from pleasance to felicity. After noticing that he has discussed virtuousness, friendly relationship and pleasance, he goes on to happiness that is the following of import thing to understand, since it is what humans purpose at as an terminal. He recapitulates from earlier remarks that felicity is non a province, but instead an activity, and that some activities are necessary and that it should be counted as an activity that is choiceworthy in itself. This, claims Aristotle is the character of actions showing virtuousness ; & # 8220 ; for making all right and first-class things is choiceworthy for itself & # 8221 ; ( 1176b5-8 ) .
Following, Aristotle comments on the nature of amusement, clear uping that amusement and felicity are non the same thing. Simply because people who hold supreme power spend clip on activities of amusement, they simply appear to hold felicity. At 1176b20, Aristotle is dedicated to the recognition that people who hold the power do non hold virtuousness and apprehension. Because of their power, they are incognizant of pure pleasance and resort to bodily pleasances alternatively. Aristotle reminds us once more that things that are choiceworthy to nice people are different from things that are choiceworthy to establish people. Happiness is non amusement, for, as Aristotle says at 1186b30, & # 8220 ; it would be absurd if the terminal were amusement, and our womb-to-tomb attempts and agonies aimed at diverting ourselves & # 8221 ; . Indeed it would look like a barbarous cosmic gag were that the instance. Besides that, the look of virtuousness is a womb-to-tomb endeavor in itself. Beyond the necessity of the hunt for felicity, amusement takes the signifier of bodily pleasances and & # 8220 ; anyone at all, even a slave, no less the best individual, might bask bodily pleasances ; but no 1 would let that a slave portion in felicity, if one does non [ besides allow that a slave portions in the kind of ] life [ needed for felicity ] & # 8221 ; ( 1177a8-10 ) .
If so, bodily pleasures bring amusement, what is it that brings felicity? Aristotle suggests at 1177a7, that the virtuousness of the best thing, actively expressed is felicity. And since Aristotle claims at 1177a15-20 that & # 8220 ; the best is understanding & # 8230 ; Hence complete felicity will be its activity showing its proper virtuousness ; and we have said that this activity is the activity of study. & # 8221 ;
The activity of theoretical survey is the best because it is supreme and the objects of understanding are the supreme objects of cognition. Furthermore, it is uninterrupted because uninterrupted survey is more easy done than any kind of uninterrupted action since all actions must come to a halt at some point. Not merely is it uninterrupted, but besides the pleasantest, the most self-sufficing, purposes at no terminal beyond itself and involves leisure. But it is the autonomy that Aristotle focuses on as the most of import. His claim is that all virtuous people need the good things for life, and even when these things are supplied, the merely individual needs other people to be merely to. The wise individual in comparing does non necessitate any other individual, because he is able to analyze without anyone ( 1177a30 ) . Ronna Burger, in her essay & # 8220 ; Aristotle & # 8217 ; s & # 8216 ; Exclusive & # 8217 ; Account of Happiness: Brooding Wisdom as a Guise of the Political Philosopher & # 8221 ; remarks on his claim of autonomy:
The autonomy that was supposed to belong to happiness as a concluding good is the standard, above all, that makes the thesis of the 10th book so flimsy: if the self-sufficient is that which on its ain makes life choiceworthy and missing nil, how could contemplation by itself perchance carry through that demand? But no such claim is in fact made in the 10th book. What is said to belong & # 8220 ; most of all & # 8221 ; to theoretical activity is & # 8220 ; alleged autonomy & # 8221 ; ( X.7 1177a26-28 ) , and this no longer means the capacity of an activity by itself to do life complete, but merely the capacity for that activity to be carried on independently of necessary conditions ( Ronna Burger, p89 )
It & # 8217 ; s high quality lies in that & # 8220 ; a human being & # 8217 ; s complete felicity will be this activity, if it receives a complete span of life, since nil incomplete is proper to happiness & # 8221 ; ( 1175b25 ) . This possible accomplishment of felicity would keep a godly component to it. Populating this kind of life is more a god-like life and allows worlds to acquire closer to the Gods. Aristotle comments that one should non follow the adage to & # 8220 ; believe person because you are mortal & # 8221 ; , but to try at every opportunity to travel farther since it entirely surpasses everything ( 11787a1 ) .
In speculating about the actions of the Gods, Aristotle remarks on the uncertainty that the Gods are non inclined to be bothered with merely, brave, or generous actions, since these are actions that make sense in a human universe. Without base appetencies or vulgar desires, there is no demand for moderation, and the earthly virtuousnesss would look fiddling to the Gods. Because the Gods are presumed alive and there is no needed action or production, the lone thing left for the Gods to make is analyze. And since it is the activities that are most like the Gods & # 8217 ; that should be emulated, it appears obvious that analyzing is the human activity that is most like the Gods. The natural decision to pull from this so is that & # 8220 ; felicity will be some sort of survey & # 8221 ; ( 1178b30 ) .
Aristotle does non nevertheless bury that worlds are non Gods, and because they are non, there are still earthly and external demands that require fulfilment. Study entirely can non let a human to last, for he needs nutriment for his organic structure and other external goods. What is of import to recognize nevertheless, is that & # 8220 ; autonomy and action do non depend on extra & # 8230 ; for even from moderate resources we can make the actions showing virtuousness & # 8221 ; ( 1179a1-5 ) .
Why so would humans pass this clip and energy on survey and moderateness? The grounds that Aristotle gives in his decision to the subdivision on felicity are twofold. The first is that he claims that the Gods, if they pay attending to the worlds, will love those who are most kindred to them, and will profit them most. Since it is the wise individual who is most kindred to the Gods, they will love him best. Within that, it is besides assumed that the wise individual excessively will be happiest ( 1179a25-30 ) .
In the concluding portion of Book X, Aristotle moves from pleasance and felicity to moralss, moral instruction and into political relations. His first recognition is that the purpose of surveies should be to move on them, despite earlier claims that it is the speculating instead than the playing that is better. His idea here is that cognizing is non plenty ; virtue must be acted upon.
Virtue, he claims, is something that is possessed by the few. The many behave because they are driven to obey by fright instead than shame. These people avoid the base activities because they fear the punishments instead than encompassing the proper pleasances. They are nescient of the things that are all right. The job so lies in the method of reformation of people populating this coarse life into those who desire the pure and the all right ( 1179b10-15 ) .
Nature, wont and instruction are the three things that are most thought of as ways to educate on morality. A trust on nature to bring forth moral existences is foolish because it is beyond the control of worlds. Those who are thought to be blessed by deity are fortunate. Those who are non blessed, nevertheless, must be taught as pupils and wonts reinforced throughout life. Morality is hard to learn if immoral grownups bring up a kid. At 1179b30, Aristotle explains that by the clip the instruction has begun we & # 8220 ; must already in some manner have a character suitable for virtuousness, fond of what is all right and objecting to what is black & # 8221 ; . This description of what is needed is made clear at this point. J. A. Stewart says that this is the & # 8220 ; truly powerful influence in moral preparation that is exerted by the regulations, written and unwritten, and the establishments of the State as a whole & # 8221 ; ( J A. Stewart, p 462 ) . It is because of this that both grownups and kids need moral Torahs. There is no confidence on how a kid will be brought up, so if the province could be responsible alternatively, there would be a greater opportunity for broader success. Through this method of province imposed morality Torahs, those who are nice will obey the Torahs because it is a portion of their character. Those who disobey the Torahs would be penalized and corrected. Those who are incurable would merely be expelled from society, which would non count since they are non nice and could non decently contribute.
Because jurisprudence has ground on its side, it would be a far superior pedagogue than a male parent who is an single and far more easy to disregard. Since provinces do non take it upon themselves to pass morality, it ends up being left to the male parent though. The job is, is that no affair which party, the province or the single, there is a necessity for legislative scientific discipline to be used. It is possible for either system to work, because the person can hold a instance created particularly for him, but it would far more effectual if cosmopolitan Torahs governed him. Amelie Rorty remarks on the ground for the interpolation of the political thoughts at the decision of a book of moralss in his essay & # 8220 ; The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle & # 8217 ; s Nicomachean Ethics & # 8221 ; . His idea is that & # 8220 ; the treatment of political relations which follows the treatment of contemplation in Book X is meant to demo that one of the purposes of a solon is the rapprochement of the contemplative and the practical lives & # 8221 ; ( Amelie Rorty, 378 ) .
The primary job with learning cosmopolitan morality every bit good as legislative scientific discipline is who the instructors should be. There seems to be a demand for a in-between land between theory and practical experience. Politicians are of no usage because some, like & # 8220 ; the Sophists who advertise that they teach political relations [ do non ] pattern it & # 8221 ; ( 1181a1 ) . Those that do pattern it do non needfully utilize idea in their actions. The right attack seems to be someplace between these two thoughts. If it is contemplation that is the highest signifier of felicity, and action that comes from this contemplation can come to be, so possibly there is some cogency to this concluding idea. Alternatively of seeking rapidly to reply it though, Aristotle closes off the Nicomachean Ethics, and opens the door for The Politics.
Pleasure and felicity and moral idea and action all have conjoining thoughts that can bind them into one another. Aristotle was able to see that, and while he was cognizant that the art of political relations or statecraft could non be taught, but the construct is at that place. And while this was written over two millenary ago, there are constructs that could easy be brought to the present. The job seems to be that there remains a fright of the philosopher that can non be overcome. Plato may hold had something with the Philosopher Kings.
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Burger, Ronna. & # 8220 ; Aristotle & # 8217 ; s & # 8216 ; Exclusive & # 8217 ; Account of Happiness: Brooding Wisdom as a Guise of the Political Philosopher & # 8221 ; in The Crossroads of Norm and Nature. Ed. May Sim. Maryland: Rowan & A ; Littlefield Publishers, 1995.
Rorty, Amelie. & # 8220 ; The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle & # 8217 ; s Nicomachean Ethics & # 8221 ; in Essays on Aristotle & # 8217 ; s Ethical motives. Berkeley: Regents of the University of California, 1980.
Stewart, J. A. Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle Vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892.
