Critically Evaluate The Cognitive Theory Of Stereotyping.
Essay, Research Paper
Critically measure the cognitive theory of pigeonholing.
B231: Social Interaction, Exam Paper 1998, Question 4.
Graeme Gordon
Pigeonholing is a signifier of pre opinion that is as prevalent in today & # 8217 ; s society as it was 2000 old ages ago. It is a societal attitude that has stood the trial of clip and received much attending by societal psychologists and philosophers likewise. Many attacks to, or theories of pigeonholing have therefore been raised. This essay evaluates the cognitive attack that classification is an indispensable cognitive procedure that necessarily leads to pigeonholing. Hamilton ( 1979 ) calls this a & # 8216 ; dejecting quandary & # 8217 ; .
Brown & # 8217 ; s ( 1995 ) definition of pigeonholing through bias is the & # 8216 ; keeping of derogative societal attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the look of negative affect, or the show of hostile or prejudiced behavior towards members of a group on history of their rank to that group & # 8217 ; . This definition implies that pigeonholing is chiefly a group procedure, through the persons psyche & # 8217 ; s within that group. A farther thought of pigeonholing, defined by Allport ( 1954 ) as & # 8216 ; believing ailment of others without warrant & # 8217 ; , is that people & # 8216 ; do their head up & # 8217 ; without any personal experience. This pre opinion about a whole group is so transferred to the stigmatization of any persons in that group. It is these thoughts that the essay aims to measure, through the cognitive procedure of classification and the above definitions that conveying approximately three distinguishable characteristics of stereotyping, that our knowledge can be demonstrated through.
The first feature of pigeonholing is over-generalisation. A figure of surveies conducted found that different combinations of traits were associated with groups of different cultural and national beginning ( Katz and Braly, 1933 ) . However, pigeonholing does non connote that all members of a group are judged in these ways, merely that a typical member of a group can be categorised in such opinions, that they possess the features of the group. Still, when we talk of a group, we do so by conceive ofing a member of that group.
The 2nd characteristic and feature of stereotyping is the hyperbole of the difference between 1s ain group ( the in-group ) and the & # 8216 ; other & # 8217 ; group ( the out-group ) . This can be traced back to the work of Tajfel during the 1950 & # 8217 ; s & # 8211 ; & # 8216 ; the accentuation rule & # 8217 ; ( Tajfel, 1981 ) . Tajfel & # 8217 ; s work was specifically on physical stimulation, and concluded that opinions on such stimulations are non made in isolation, but in the context of other factors. Applied socially & # 8211 ; a opinion about an out-group relies upon other factors environing the opinion in inquiry, every bit good as doing a statement about the in-group and the relationship between the two groups. Through stereotyping and classification we exaggerate the differences between the groups. From this comes the consequence that in believing an out-group is homogeneous, through overdone differences, their in-group is non & # 8211 ; with really much less over-generalisation taking topographic point ( Linville, et al. , 1986 ) .
The 3rd feature of stereotyping is that of the look of values. Most stereotyped opinions of group features are in fact moral ratings ( Howitt, et al. , 1989 ) . For illustration, Katz and Braly ( 1933 ) studied a group of pupils & # 8217 ; attitudes to towards minority groups. They found that Jews were attributed to being & # 8216 ; mean & # 8217 ; ( in footings of money ) , instead than they themselves being & # 8217 ; spendthrifts & # 8217 ; . Besides, they found that there was a strong position that Gallic people were & # 8216 ; excitable & # 8217 ; . This really implies that they are over-excitable & # 8211 ; above the norm, as everybody is excitable, per Se, and therefore there would be no necessity to advert it. Reasoning from this, it is valid to state that a value has been put on a characteristic & # 8211 ; in this instance, a stereotyped one.
A unfavorable judgment with much of this research is that participants are asked to do opinions out of societal context & # 8211 ; in abstract state of affairss. Howitt, et Al. ( 1989 ) say that this leads to a derogative deduction: that imputing a group with a feature is besides keep backing others. However, pigeonholing leads to more than simply puting an adjectival onto a group or class. The cognitive procedures that give ground to pigeonholing are much deeper than this, giving rise to the above features.
The cognitive attack to stereotyping is that we all stereotype, at changing degrees & # 8211 ; because of the indispensable cognitive procedure of classification ( Brown, 1995 ) . Howitt, et Al. ( 1989 ) take this position besides, and add that it is an ordinary procedure of idea to over-generalise, and so protect it.
We live in a complex societal environment, which we need to simplify into groups, or classs. This simplification is present at all degrees of life & # 8211 ; it is portion of our linguistic communication, separating between Canis familiaris and cat, male and female, and even in the basic motivations of separating between nutrient and non-food. Such classification may look linguistically simple, but is indispensable & # 8211 ; for illustration, the categorization of elements and beings by life scientists and chemists: & # 8216 ; one of the most basic maps of all beings is the cutting up of the environment into categorizations & # 8217 ; ( Rosch, et al. , 1976 ) . However, the point must be made that, even though linguistic communication suggests so, classification leads to different maps and characteristics in non-humans and worlds. For pigeonholing is non present in non-humans, therefore, we may come to the decision that pigeonholing is possible through linguistics & # 8211 ; this subject is discussed farther subsequently. This classification besides has changing deepnesss of moral significance, or value, which can take to changing degrees of stereotyping. For illustration, the classification of Catholic & # 8211 ; Protestant in Northern Ireland. Classification is seen as a manner of telling what we perceive ( Billig, 1985 ) , stimulation of the external universe that needs to be simplified, utilizing & # 8216 ; iconic images, to go through into our short-run memory & # 8217 ; ( Neisser, 1976 ) . This simplification procedure transforms James & # 8217 ; & # 8216 ; blooming, bombinating confusion & # 8217 ; into a more manageable universe in which it is easier to accommodate & # 8211 ; classification is a cognitive version. For we do non hold the capableness to react otherwise to each stimulation, whether it be a individual, an object, or an event. Classification is of import in every twenty-four hours life, every bit good as in the most utmost of fortunes & # 8211 ; for illustration, the favoritism between friend and enemy.
For classification to be utile, we enhance the difference between groups. This was found to be the instance at both societal and physical degrees, and subsequently became known as the & # 8216 ; accentuation rule & # 8217 ; ( see above ) . However, the differentiation between physical stimulations and & # 8217 ; societal objects & # 8217 ; must be made clear. We ourselves our & # 8217 ; societal objects & # 8217 ; , therefore, we are implicated by such classifications. As Hogg and Abrams ( 1988 ) province: & # 8216 ; it would be parlous to ignore this consideration & # 8217 ; . This can be seen in the accentuation of out-group homogeneousness ( Park and Rothbart, 1982 ) .
Tajfel ( 1981 ) made two hypothesis on the cognitive effects of classification. First, that if stimulations are put into classs, so this in itself enhances the difference between groups. Second, on a societal degree, persons of different groups appear more different from each other, and those of the same group, more similar. Tajfel studied opinions of physical stimulations, utilizing two classs, and found that the extremes of these groups were exaggerated. However, the differences within the two classs were reduced. This was the first of many experiments proving the two hypotheses, all determination that presenting classification into an otherwise uniform state of affairs, distorts people & # 8217 ; s perceptual and cognitive logical thinking, and their operation. Further surveies have been conducted with the purpose of taking these findings beyond the physical degree, and into the societal context, by analyzing the favoritism of the in-group over the out-groups & # 8211 ; pre opinion, or pigeonholing.
Horwitz and Rabbie ( 1982 ) reported on an earlier experiment in which they demonstrated this inter-group favoritism. They found that, in groups of four people, for there to be any inter-group opinions, or prejudices, perchance a feeling of mutuality was needed in add-on to classification itself, even in the most nonmeaningful classification of groups. A more recent experiment that they conducted found that, with larger group Numberss, in-group & # 8211 ; out-group favoritism was present.
Tajfel ( 1981 ) studied the & # 8216 ; intending & # 8217 ; of a group, and found that merely belonging to a group, of no significance, is adequate to take to pigeonholing. Simply belonging to a group meant that topics were put into one of two classs, that had no group features attached to them ( i.e. interaction, beliefs, old background ) . Such a design has become known as the Minimal Group Paradigm. The topics in this peculiar experiment were assigned to one of the two classs by their penchants of a group of pictures by two creative persons, and done so anonymously. Using code Numberss ( which specified what group each topic was in ) and a set of matrices, the topics were asked to apportion money to different people. They found that more money was given to topics of the same group than the other group. With no information except group rank, this must hold been the lone cause for such favoritism, maximizing the differences between the two groups.
Harmonizing to Allport & # 8217 ; s earlier definition of pigeonholing, such a pre opinion must be immune to alter. Such opposition may be put down to the procedures of believing taking to prejudices ( Howitt, et al. , 1989 ) , as seen in the experiment above. For us to believe that our prejudgments are right, what we perceive to be is what we see. For illustration, Duncan ( 1976 ) showed that how we perceive the societal universe can be affected by our classifications, such as, in this instance, racial stereotypes. The survey found that, because black people were stereotyped as aggressive people ( by the topics ) , the topics perceived a state of affairs as being more aggressive, near to a battle, when played by black histrions whereas with white histrions, it was seen as playful.
Such prejudices may besides be looked at as self-fulfilling, or even self-protecting, the & # 8217 ; sense of ego & # 8217 ; . This self positiveness is & # 8216 ; natural & # 8217 ; , and as such can be projected onto one & # 8217 ; s perceptual experience of the in-group & # 8211 ; holding similar effects at the other terminal of the spectrum. That is, a negative position of an person, projected onto & # 8216 ; their & # 8217 ; group, or the out-group. This is the ground for most stereotypes being negative.
Our categorisat
ion and prejudices can besides hold an consequence on others. Essed ( 1988 ) found that white stereotyping of black people had a detrimental consequence in occupation interviews, through uncomfortableness and unrest due to the inquiries asked during the interview. This survey was conducted out of the research lab. A farther illustration of the effects of racial pigeonholing on others is a reproduction of a British authorities commissioned survey in which a black and a white individual apply to lease a level. The landlords pre opinion of black people through pigeonholing affected the black man’s opportunity and legal right to lease the level ( BBC telecasting, Black and White, 1987 ) . This is an illustration of the out-group homogeneousness consequence ( Brown, 1995 ) .
Equally good as hyperbole of inter-group differences, another cardinal consequence of classification is the sweetening of intra-group similarities, known as inter-group homogeneousness. The consequence of this cognitive procedure of idea, through classification is the perceptual experience that the out-group is more homogeneous than the in-group
Hamilton ( 1979 ) found that black households were viewed in more categorical footings than white households, who were separately perceived. Jones, et Al. ( 1981 ) found a similar consequence ; that members of university nines saw their group members & # 8217 ; personality traits as more diverse than out-group members & # 8217 ; . A unfavorable judgment of this survey, and the homogeneousness consequence as a whole, is that members of an in-group will cognize their equals more than those of the out-group, particularly in footings of personality. Therefore, such surveies do non lend entirely to the cognitive account of pigeonholing. However, the homogeneousness consequence has undergone probe by many surveies, and conflicting grounds has arisen. Nevertheless, a point that has been overlooked is that, with members of an in-group recognising variableness within their group, certainly such variableness is seen by members of an out-group, within their group. This displays a cognitive mistake of ignorance. Even so, there is no empirical grounds to back up such a claim.
Classification, harmonizing to the above, is a & # 8216 ; natural & # 8217 ; cognitive procedure, that & # 8216 ; of course & # 8217 ; leads to pigeonholing. As Howitt, et Al. ( 1989 ) province: & # 8216 ; cognitive kineticss [ of pigeonholing ] are a natural portion of thought because we must categorize the societal universe, and in making so, necessarily construct up stereotyped premises, protected by our cognitive prejudices & # 8217 ; .
The cognitive attack of classification does hold its defects nevertheless. Classification theoreticians give a instead mechanistic feeling of knowledge, and therefore, their attack to pigeonholing ( Billig, 1985 ) .
We do hold a pick in our premises and there is a flexibleness about human thought ( Howitt, et al. , 1989 ) . Therefore, knowledge is non every bit stiff as classification implies. It is an simplism in itself to propose that linguistic communication oversimplifies the universe, because it is due to linguistic communication that our positions of the societal universe can be expressed. However, linguistic communication does non hold to be present for pigeonholing to be present. For illustration, the Minimal Group Paradigm. Even so, linguistic communication AIDSs our classification and therefore, our pigeonholing. It is the same linguistic communication that we may utilize to pigeonhole that enables us to be the contrary. For illustration, in the interviews mentioned above, the interviewers could be taught to inquire non-categorical inquiries. As constructs in our heads, tolerance is every bit easy as bias.
Our supposed necessity to simplify the universe, as we are & # 8216 ; incapable & # 8217 ; of taking in & # 8216 ; every new stimulation as alone & # 8217 ; ( Park and Rothbart, 1982 ) , may besides be balanced by a statement of the antonym: & # 8216 ; we would happen trouble in accommodating to a universe which required action, if no new stimulation could be treated as alone, but every alone stimulation had to be considered as similar to others & # 8217 ; ( Billig, 1985 ) . This is the footing of Billig & # 8217 ; s statement of particularization against classification & # 8211 ; that gives rise to the procedures of individualization & # 8211 ; handling and comprehending group members as persons. Classification argues that, through our & # 8216 ; natural & # 8217 ; form of idea, or knowledge, our perceptual experience of stimulation is categorised by its similarities instead than its individualism. Billig suggests that this can alter, through a motivational procedure in classification itself, giving flexibleness to such cognitive procedures.
We are cognizant of the possibility and ability to alter. However, we do non show this flexibleness because it is a break of the norm, or, of the societal group-thought. Goffman ( 1959 ) positions mundane life as dramaturgical ( & # 8217 ; All the universe & # 8217 ; s a phase, and all the work forces and adult females simply participants & # 8230 ; & # 8217 ; Shakespeare ) . To interrupt this would be to alter the book, and interrupt out of the conformance of the societal group, self-to-self and to others. Even so, this illustrates that through our ability to categorize, we have the ability to specify and & # 8216 ; make more with the stimulations than accumulate more cases of preset classs & # 8217 ; ( Billig, 1985 ) .
In Billig & # 8217 ; s alternate attack to stereotyping, he besides raises the point of class choice & # 8211 ; a job that cognitive psychologists have frequently overlooked. Tversky and Gati ( 1978 ) found that different stimulations are judged on their similarities and differences before classification and this opinion can be different depending on what manner the stimulation is perceived. Billig & # 8217 ; s point is that we must specify before categorizing and therefore a nexus has been formed.
Categorisation implies a rigidness in our knowledge. Stereotypes, by nature, are over generalizations. Such inflexibleness is non a possible procedure of our knowledge & # 8211 ; & # 8216 ; classification do non be in isolation & # 8217 ; ( Billig, 1985 ) . As classification leads to many classs, through its definition, certainly merely one such class could perchance be so stiff and inflexible, as other classs must be used by it, and therefore be flexible. Therefore, classification is non a stiff procedure, but involves change & # 8211 ; which is reflective of our knowledge and alteration is possible ( conflicting with Allport & # 8217 ; s definition ) .
The difference between two groups affects other properties of the out-group, including those that are similar to the in-group. By subdividing farther such similarities, we are originating a defense mechanism against alteration in our attitudes and classs. This ingeniousness is another illustration of the flexibleness of classification. In the most utmost instances, this can take to an ingeniousness demonstrated by racial theoreticians, which in fact, contradicts their bias and rigidness of classs. This flexibleness can be illustrated farther by surveies that have shown that in stereotyping, people imply that most of a group posses a stereotyped trait but non all members. Therefore, is the demand for & # 8217 ; particular instances & # 8217 ; , realization of individualization and tolerance ( Billig, 1985 ) .
Harmonizing to the cognitive attack, pigeonholing is a group procedure. It may happen in groups, but it is the single minds that make up the group, that project their stereotypes through a group. We do hold the ability to see people as persons and specify their alone features. We can alter, as even classification is flexible, which undermines the cognitive attack with classification, although it may take clip on a societal degree.
To reason, the cognitive attack entirely does non give us an apprehension of pigeonholing. However, it does ground the fact that through our & # 8216 ; natural & # 8217 ; thought processes we do categorize, which leads to pigeonholing. It besides highlights the importance of the person and the group. There are, nevertheless, jobs that have been overlooked by cognitive psychologists which we need to understand, in order to to the full understand the & # 8216 ; altering kineticss and nature of pigeonholing in our society & # 8217 ; ( Howitt, et al. , 1989 ) . There is besides the demand to look farther than the causes of pigeonholing and into its effects in order to understand the procedures of our idea, of stereotyping.
Mentions
ALLPORT, G.W. ( 1954 ) . The nature of bias. London: Addison-Wesley.
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DUNCAN, B.L. ( 1976 ) . Differential societal perceptual experience and ascription of intergroup force: Testing the lower bounds of pigeonholing inkinesss, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 590-598.
ESSED, P. ( 1988 ) . Understanding verbal histories of racism: Politicss and heuristics of world buildings, Text, 8, 5-40.
HAMILTON, D.L. ( 1979 ) . A cognitive & # 8211 ; attributional analysis of pigeonholing, In: Berkovitz, L. ( ed. ) , Advances in Experimental Psychology, Vol. 12, Academic Press, New York.
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KATZ, D. & A ; BRALY, K. ( 1993 ) . Racial bias and racial stereotypes, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 30, 175-93.
LINVILLE, P.W. , SALOVEY, P. & A ; FISCHER, G.W. ( 1986 ) . Pigeonholing and sensed distributions of societal features: An application to in-group & # 8211 ; out-group perceptual experiences, In: Dovido, J.F. and Gaertner, S.L. ( explosive detection systems. ) , Prejudice, favoritism and racism, Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
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