The Congress System

& # 8211 ; An Admirable And Enlightened Example Of International Co-operation? Essay, Research Paper

After the Congress of Vienna it became evident that there was a new hierarchy of power in Europe. The hegemony of France was destroyed and she had been replaced by Great Britain and Russia as the dominant force behind European personal businesss. Both these states were peripheral powers with involvements and ownerships beyond Europe, but aside from this, the two had alarmingly small in common. They had been united in their common aversion to Napoleon, but now with France at last defeated, they were get downing to float apart chiefly as a consequence of their rival pretenses to the leading of the new Europe. The first marks of a rift between these new dominant forces in Europe was at the Vienna Conference, when determinations were being made as to how best to maintain peace in Europe. It was widely accepted by the great powers that the best manner of carry throughing this aim was to keep the four-power confederation already in being and in so making keep France in cheque. In 1815 each of the four Alliess recognised France as the chief beginning of danger to both peace and order, as non merely was she the place of the revolution but besides the power least satisfied with the new territorial agreements. So, the continuance of the confederation against France seemed the obvious reply to forestalling farther bloodshed in Europe. However, the care of the confederation raised two of import inquiries: foremost the signifier it was to take ; and 2nd, in the wake of the dissensions between the Alliess at Vienna, which power, Great Britain or Russia, would rule it. The separation of these two inquiries ne’er occurred and the Anglo-Russian power battle virtually dominated all other issues in the following decennary. In November 1815, the British and Russians each made their ain proposals for the continuance of the confederation. A practical footing for co-operation was the purpose of Catlereagh & # 8217 ; s Quadruple Alliance, with its proviso under Article VI for periodic meetings of the powers. His purpose was that within this agreement England and Austria would hold a particular and dominant relationship, enabling them to command Russia every bit good as to incorporate the Gallic. Equally far as revolutions were concerned, Castlereagh thought it best that the powers should see each job as it arose. Alexander & # 8217 ; s alternate confederation surely believed in maintaining Monarchs in their rightful topographic points and was hence on the whole against any signifier of revolution. Apart from this monarchal solidarity against revolution, the confederation was highly obscure and this was in portion due to the fact that Alexander, unlike Castlereagh, had evolved no clear scheme with which to prosecute Russian purposes in the post-war universe. When it became clear to him that the Holy Alliance was an uneffective counterweight to the Quadruple Alliance he all but abandoned it and concentrated his attempts at sabotaging British influence through the confederation which Castlereagh had created. The lone possible footing for continued co-operation between Great Britain and Russia: a finding to maintain France in cheque. However, it was Britain herself who found herself going progressively alienated after Vienna and this was something which she did non mind all that much. Great Britain owed her strength to her fast developing economic system, her extended abroad trade and her matchless naval power. The fact that in 1815 Castlereagh had jealously guarded Britain & # 8217 ; s unchallenged command of the seas and oceans, while at the same time seeking to incorporate the power of France and limit the enlargement of Russia had given the Gallic and Russians a community of involvement. Both these states resented what they regarded as Britain & # 8217 ; s dual criterions, keeping her ain naval hegemony while trying to keep the military power of her challengers. Indeed, Great Britain and the Continental powers had different precedences in the decennaries following Vienna and there was a general misgiving amongst the states of Europe of British commercial policy, which was regarded as aggressive and the British authorities was suspected of a willingness to give political rules for commercial addition. Surely Britain was non every bit acute as the other European provinces to keep the bing political and societal constructions, but merely that peace and order were maintained as a necessary status for economic and commercial enlargement. Britain & # 8217 ; s involuntariness to back up the invasion of Spain and Naples in order to reconstruct the old swayers confirms the above point. During the old ages after Aix la Chapelle, Great Britain bit by bit receded from the personal businesss of

the ‘Concert of Europe’ , until lone perceivers were sent to conferences and by the clip Canning took over as Foreign Minister, he had no vacillation in weaving up Britain’s function in European personal businesss. He felt it was necessary to make this as non merely were there critical issues, like the intercession in Spain, that Britain was non willing to hold to, but besides there was a desire to be without confederations and committednesss which would surely affect the state in war once more if another European struggle developed. Therefore Britain returned to her s tandard post-war policy, in those yearss, of isolation. Of the other European great powers, Russia was the most powerful as already mentioned, and although Austria and Prussia both recovered their places as the taking Cardinal European powers, they were ne’er traveling to keep as much sway as Russia or Britain, so for this ground, they spent most of the clip after Vienna trying to ally themselves to the states who would offer them protection from invasion. Austria feared an onslaught from Russia and hence ab initio allied herself with Britain, the lone state capable of contending Russia on equal footings, and so on the backdown of Britain from Europe, she sought to stay on friendly footings with Russia. Prussia on the other manus feared an onslaught from the West, coming from France, and as a strong sense of dynastic links inclined the Prussians towards Russia and an every bit strong feeling of German solidarity drew them towards Austria, the Prussians were ever energetic advocators of an Austro-Russian apprehension directed against France. France’s basic purpose in foreign policy was to happen a revisionist ally, as merely by making this could she trust to undo the 1815 colony and to free themselves of the alliance against them and the attendant isolation. While the alliance against her existed, France was forced to play the same function as Austria and Prussia ; she had to attach herself to either Russia or Great Britain. However, unlike the two German provinces, France sought an alliance non for security but to interrupt out of isolation and to get down to destruct the Vienna colony. The ultimate purpose of Gallic foreign policy was to recover the leading of Europe which she had lost to Britain and Russia in 1815. With Britain and Russia locked in a acrimonious battle for power, France plotting to recover her place as leader of Europe and Austria and Prussia madly allying themselves to whichever state best suited their demands, the ambiance in Europe after Vienna could barely be described as good-humored. The Congress System could ne’er be described as ‘admirable’ or ‘enlightened’ when there were so many jobs confronting post-war Europe: the Anglo-Russian battle for the leading of the confederation was the dominant issue from the beginning, and linked with this job was the inquiry over the nature and intent of the confederation. Should it be for good restricted to the four winning Alliess, or should it be extended to include France? Was the confederation intended to be no more than the model within which the Alliess consulted each other on common jobs, or should the Alliess use the confederation as the agencies to set up rules for common action and as the ultimate countenance for action itself? The fact that the radical spirit was still alive and good in Europe made the issue over the confederation all the more of import, and can itself be classified as another job. By the 1820’s, a 4th major job had arisen: revolution within the Ottoman Empire, which raised the wider issues of what action the great powers should take and convey Anglo-Russian dissensions to the bow. Besides, there was the effort by France to retrieve from the catastrophes of licking and business and to work all the tensenesss between the four Alliess to advance in order to make so. It was the interaction of these five jobs which resulted in the collaspe of the confederation and the Congress System by the mid 1820’s. The Congress System represented the first efforts by any states to put up an international administration, which would run into on a regular basis to maintain order and prevent war, sing this, the states involved should be commended on their attempts. However, the conflicting involvements and competitions in the station Napoleonic epoch ensured that any efforts to keep a co-operative administration were finally doomed.Bibliography:<:#284,9360>Old ages of Nationalism L. Cowie & R. Wolfson<:#284,9360>The Great Powers and the European States System F.R. Bridge & R. Bullen<:#284,9360>An Illustrated History of Modern Europe D. Richards<:#284,9360>Europe 1780-1830 F.L. Ford